To shed light on the global reassertion of authoritarianism in recent years, this volume analyses transnational diffusion and international cooperation among non-democratic regimes. How and with what effect do authoritarian regimes learn from each other? For what purpose and how successfully do they cooperate? The volume highlights that present-day autocrats pursue mainly pragmatic interests, rather than ideological missions. Consequently, the connections among authoritarian regimes have primarily defensive purposes, especially insulation against democracy promotion by the West. As a result, the authors do not foresee a major recession of democracy, as occurred with the rise of fascism during the interwar years. The chapters in this book were originally published in a special issue of Democratization.

To shed light on the global reassertion of authoritarianism in recent years, this volume analyses transnational diffusion and international cooperation among non-democratic regimes. How and with what effect do authoritarian regimes learn from each other? For what purpose and how successfully do they cooperate? The volume highlights that present-day autocrats pursue mainly pragmatic interests, rather than ideological missions. Consequently, the connections among authoritarian regimes have primarily defensive purposes, especially insulation against democracy promotion by the West. As a result, the authors do not foresee a major recession of democracy, as occurred with the rise of fascism during the interwar years. The chapters in this book were originally published in a special issue of Democratization.

The interwar years saw the greatest reversal of political liberalization and democratization in modern history. Why and how did dictatorship proliferate throughout Europe and Latin America in the 1920s and 1930s? Blending perspectives from history, comparative politics, and cognitive psychology, Kurt Weyland argues that the Russian Revolution sparked powerful elite groupings that, fearing communism, aimed to suppress imitation attempts inspired by Lenin's success. Fears of Communism fueled doubts about the defensive capacity of liberal democracy, strengthened the ideological right, and prompted the rise of fascism in many countries. Yet, as fascist movements spread, their extremity and violence also sparked conservative backlash that often blocked their seizure of power. Weyland teases out the differences across countries, tracing how the resulting conflicts led to the imposition of fascist totalitarianism in Italy and Germany and the installation of conservative authoritarianism in Eastern and Southern Europe and Latin America.

The interwar years saw the greatest reversal of political liberalization and democratization in modern history. Why and how did dictatorship proliferate throughout Europe and Latin America in the 1920s and 1930s? Blending perspectives from history, comparative politics, and cognitive psychology, Kurt Weyland argues that the Russian Revolution sparked powerful elite groupings that, fearing communism, aimed to suppress imitation attempts inspired by Lenin's success. Fears of Communism fueled doubts about the defensive capacity of liberal democracy, strengthened the ideological right, and prompted the rise of fascism in many countries. Yet, as fascist movements spread, their extremity and violence also sparked conservative backlash that often blocked their seizure of power. Weyland teases out the differences across countries, tracing how the resulting conflicts led to the imposition of fascist totalitarianism in Italy and Germany and the installation of conservative authoritarianism in Eastern and Southern Europe and Latin America.

This study investigates the three main waves of political regime contention in Europe and Latin America. Surprisingly, protest against authoritarian rule spread across countries more quickly in the nineteenth century, yet achieved greater success in bringing democracy in the twentieth. To explain these divergent trends, the book draws on cognitive-psychological insights about the inferential heuristics that people commonly apply; these shortcuts shape learning from foreign precedents such as an autocrat's overthrow elsewhere. But these shortcuts had different force, depending on the political-organizational context. In the inchoate societies of the nineteenth century, common people were easily swayed by these heuristics: jumping to the conclusion that they could replicate such a foreign precedent in their own countries, they precipitously challenged powerful rulers, yet often at inopportune moments - and with low success. By the twentieth century, however, political organizations had formed. As organizational ties loosened the bounds of rationality, contentious waves came to spread less rapidly, but with greater success.

Why did so many Latin American leftists believe they could replicate the Cuban Revolution in their own countries, and why did so many rightists fear the spread of Communism? Cognitive-psychological insights about people's distorted inferences and skewed interest calculations explain why the left held exaggerated hopes and why the right experienced excessive dread. The resulting polarization provoked a powerful backlash in which the right uniformly defeated the left. To forestall the feared spread of revolution, the military in many countries imposed authoritarian regimes and brutally suppressed left-wingers. Overly worried about the advance of Cuban-inspired radicalism as well, the United States condoned and supported the installation of dictatorship, but Latin American elites took the main initiative in these regressive regime changes. With a large number of primary and secondary sources, this book documents how the misperceptions on both sides of the ideological divide thus played a crucial role in the frequent destruction of democracy.

The victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 election left specialists of American politics perplexed and concerned about the future of US democracy. Because no populist leader had occupied the White House in 150 years, there were many questions about what to expect. Marshaling the long-standing expertise of leading specialists of populism elsewhere in the world, this book provides the first systematic, comparative analysis of the prospects for US democracy under Trump, considering the two regions - Europe and Latin America - that have had the most ample recent experiences with populist chief executives. Chapters analyze the conditions under which populism slides into illiberal or authoritarian rule and in so doing derive well-grounded insights and scenarios for the US case, as well as a more general cross-national framework. The book makes an original argument about the likely resilience of US democracy and its institutions.

Why did so many Latin American leftists believe they could replicate the Cuban Revolution in their own countries, and why did so many rightists fear the spread of Communism? Cognitive-psychological insights about people's distorted inferences and skewed interest calculations explain why the left held exaggerated hopes and why the right experienced excessive dread. The resulting polarization provoked a powerful backlash in which the right uniformly defeated the left. To forestall the feared spread of revolution, the military in many countries imposed authoritarian regimes and brutally suppressed left-wingers. Overly worried about the advance of Cuban-inspired radicalism as well, the United States condoned and supported the installation of dictatorship, but Latin American elites took the main initiative in these regressive regime changes. With a large number of primary and secondary sources, this book documents how the misperceptions on both sides of the ideological divide thus played a crucial role in the frequent destruction of democracy.

Can Latin America s new left stimulate economic development, enhance social equity, and deepen democracy in spite of the economic and political constraints it faces? This is the first book to systematically examine the policies and performance of the left-wing governments that have risen to power in Latin America during the last decade. Featuring thorough studies of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela by renowned experts, the volume argues that moderate leftist governments have attained greater, more sustainable success than their more radical, contestatory counterparts. Moderate governments in Brazil and Chile have generated solid economic growth, reduced poverty and inequality, and created innovative and fiscally sound social programs, while respecting the fundamental principles of market economics and liberal democracy. By contrast, more radical governments, exemplified by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, have expanded state intervention and popular participation and attained some short-term economic and social successes, but they have provoked severe conflict, undermined democracy, and failed to ensure the economic and institutional sustainability of their policy projects.

"Where do new policy ideas come from? In this important book, Kurt Weyland provides an answer that satisfies both theory and practice; his findings cross disciplinary boundaries with aplomb, insight, and superb analysis of policy decision-making."--Merilee S. Grindle, Harvard University

"This is a very innovative and fruitful work that accounts better than other approaches for the crucial economic policy decisions studied by Weyland."--Guillermo O'Donnell, University of Notre Dame

"This book contains a highly innovative perspective for understanding how policymaking takes place in Latin America. The use of models of bounded rationality, applied to a remarkably vast base of empirical information, provides provocative insights into how particular policies are adopted and how the real elements of rationality that intervene in such adoption are constrained by a series of cognitive factors. This work should become a source of reflection for both national policymakers and the staff of international organizations."--Juan Carlos Navarro, Inter-American Development Bank

"This outstanding book will have a major impact on comparative politics, since it provides a comprehensive defense of the bounded rationality perspective and applies it carefully to explain patterns in the diffusion of pension and health reform in Latin America."--Mitchell Orenstein, Syracuse University

"Well organized and well written, this book makes two broad contributions to our understanding of the diffusion of social sector policies, and more generally to the comparative politics of public policy. First, in a valuable commentary on previous research, it demonstrates convincingly that some of the theories andgeneralizations in the literature are frequently overstated. Second, and quite originally, it offers an alternative conception of the process of policy choice."--Joan M. Nelson, Princeton University

The victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 election left specialists of American politics perplexed and concerned about the future of US democracy. Because no populist leader had occupied the White House in 150 years, there were many questions about what to expect. Marshaling the long-standing expertise of leading specialists of populism elsewhere in the world, this book provides the first systematic, comparative analysis of the prospects for US democracy under Trump, considering the two regions - Europe and Latin America - that have had the most ample recent experiences with populist chief executives. Chapters analyze the conditions under which populism slides into illiberal or authoritarian rule and in so doing derive well-grounded insights and scenarios for the US case, as well as a more general cross-national framework. The book makes an original argument about the likely resilience of US democracy and its institutions.

"Kurt Weyland has written an important book. From now on, it will be very hard to write about Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela or about complex political transitions without relying on the findings and insights that he offers here."--Moises Naim, Editor in Chief, "Foreign Policy Magazine"

"This is a truly original book. Weyland draws on the rich literature of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics to undertake a careful and illuminating analysis of decisions to initiate, or not, economic adjustment policies in several contemporary Latin American countries. He contrasts his innovative approach with the ones prevailing in the literature, and persuades me that his approach accounts much better for these policies than do the others. The value of this book goes well beyond the countries and the policies it discusses--this is comparative political theory at its most fruitful."--Guillermo O'Donnell, University of Notre Dame

"This is an excellent and original piece of work--a very solid piece of scholarship and clearly a contribution to the literature on the politics of reform. It fits in nicely with the tradition established first by Joan Nelson and colleagues, and then by Haggard and Kaufman."--Carol Graham, Brookings Institution, author of "Private Markets for Public Goods"

"This book makes a very significant contribution to the field. It is rare that a book is so ambitious in terms of both its breadth of empirical material and its effort to apply a theoretical framework that is, in this context, quite original. At a time when rational choice theories are increasingly dominant in comparative politics, the introduction of an alternative microlevel theory is quiterefreshing. Weyland writes very well, in a clear and easy-to-read style that makes the theoretical chapters, in particular, especially accessible to those unfamiliar with the material."--Philip Oxhorn, McGill University, author of "Organizing Civil Society"

This study investigates the three main waves of political regime contention in Europe and Latin America. Surprisingly, protest against authoritarian rule spread across countries more quickly in the nineteenth century, yet achieved greater success in bringing democracy in the twentieth. To explain these divergent trends, the book draws on cognitive-psychological insights about the inferential heuristics that people commonly apply; these shortcuts shape learning from foreign precedents such as an autocrat's overthrow elsewhere. But these shortcuts had different force, depending on the political-organizational context. In the inchoate societies of the nineteenth century, common people were easily swayed by these heuristics: jumping to the conclusion that they could replicate such a foreign precedent in their own countries, they precipitously challenged powerful rulers, yet often at inopportune moments - and with low success. By the twentieth century, however, political organizations had formed. As organizational ties loosened the bounds of rationality, contentious waves came to spread less rapidly, but with greater success.

Can Latin America's 'new left' stimulate economic development, enhance social equity, and deepen democracy in spite of the economic and political constraints it faces? This is the first book to systematically examine the policies and performance of the left-wing governments that have risen to power in Latin America during the last decade. Featuring thorough studies of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela by renowned experts, the volume argues that moderate leftist governments have attained greater, more sustainable success than their more radical, contestatory counterparts. Moderate governments in Brazil and Chile have generated solid economic growth, reduced poverty and inequality, and created innovative and fiscally sound social programs, while respecting the fundamental principles of market economics and liberal democracy. By contrast, more radical governments, exemplified by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, have expanded state intervention and popular participation and attained some short-term economic and social successes.

In "Democracy without Equity," Weyland investigates the crucial political issue for many Latin American countries: the possibility for redistributing wealth and power through the democratic process. He focuses on Brazil's redistributive initiatives in tax policy, social security, and health care. Weyland's work is based on some 260 interviews with interest group representatives, politicians, and bureaucrats, the publications of interest groups, speeches of policy makers, newspaper accounts, legislative bills, congressional committee reports, and more. He concludes that, in countries whose society and political parties are fragmented, the prospects for effective redistributive policies are poor.

The international diffusion of policy ideas and practices is a subject of growing interest, raising such questions as: Why are there increasingly such waves of policy innovation? What prompts one country to emulate another's changes? Is it the influence of powerful international actors like the World Bank? Is it the motivations and interests of domestic actors? And how freely do imitators adapt foreign models to the needs and characteristics of their own countries, rather than simply replicating them?

Essays by leading academic experts and by policy practitioners with academic background address these important questions in "Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform." Two chapters examine the influence of the international financial institutions. Then experts from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico discuss how foreign models influenced their own decision making in crucial areas of social policy such as pensions, unemployment insurance, and health care.

These case studies yield an unprecedented insider perspective on policy diffusion, in particular showing that the financial institutions have less clout than sometimes appears. They also show the crucial role played by policy specialists inside the public bureaucracy.

Contributors: David Bravo, Sarah M. Brooks, Elena Carrera, Jose Paulo Zeetano Chahad, Carlos Cruz, Gustavo Demarco, Louise Haagh, Joan M. Nelson, Vinicius C. Pinheiro, and Juan Pablo Uribe.